Purpose -This study investigates the sensitivity of firm value to exchange rate movements, and the determinants of such exposure for 100 European blue chip companies over 2001-2012. Design/methodology/approach -We adopt a disaggregated framework that distinguishes between Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms, and between financial and non-financial firms across the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods of the recent financial crisis.
attention in prior work. This is particularly striking given that at both the theoretical and empirical level there is already evidence pointing to the possibility that exposure may differ across periods. For example, Solnik (2000) points out that financial crises have a negative effect on both ERs and stock prices, in both developed and emerging markets. Empirically, Yoshida (2009) specifically tested how a financial crisis affects the linkage between foreign exchange markets and stock markets and found that following the financial crisis originating from the collapse of the US housing market in 2007, financial markets, including stock markets and foreign exchange markets, experienced drastic fluctuations during the adjustment stage. He found strong evidence of an abrupt upward shift in correlation in June 2001, and of another, though weaker, upward correlation shift in June 2008. Significantly, he also found evidence indicating a two-way causality effect between the ER and the stock market in Japan. Though limited in scope, the above propositions and related evidence provide a sound justification for investigating whether the sensitivity of firm value to ER movements varies across pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. To complement the analysis, the study also examines the determinants of significant ER exposure of firms. Doukas et al. (2003) argue that the effect of ER fluctuations on the market value of firms depends upon the ER exposure of the firm. ER exposure can directly affect firms that are involved in international trade. Domestic firms can also be affected indirectly, through a mechanism whereby ER exposure affects aggregate demand and industry competitiveness and concentration.
Brief literature review
Transaction (or direct) exposure is defined by Döhring (2008) as the impact of ER fluctuations on the cash flows from receivables (payables) from exports (imports) and the repatriation of dividends. Transaction exposure from foreign currency denominated imports arises in the same way as from foreign currency denominated exports. On the other hand, indirect exposure mainly depends upon the price elasticity of demand and the degree of substitutability of goods (Agyei-Ampomah et al., 2013) .
With respect to the determinants of ER exposure, De Jong et al. (2006) argue that firms' ER exposure varies across countries. They point out that firms in an open economy such as the Netherlands are more likely to be affected by foreign exchange risk than firms in a closed economy such as North Korea, and show that in the sample of their study, 50% of Dutch firms experience significant exposure. Hutson and Stevenson (2010) also find a significant relationship between country trade openness and ER exposure. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) argue that firms' ER exposure varies significantly across industries, its extent being dependent upon industry specific factors such as competitiveness. Bodnar et al. (2002) add that firms' indirect exposure to ER movements depends on the firm's ability to pass on to customers the increased costs (or prices) as a result of ER fluctuations. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) find that 23% of 39 US, Canadian and Japanese industries in their sample experience significant exposure. Williamson's (2001) study corroborates these findings.
However, other studies (e.g., Doidge et al., 2003; Griffin and Stulz, 2001) find only weak evidence of ER exposure. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) suggest that trade measured at industry level has a marginal impact on firms' exposure, and that firms in sectors with a high level of foreign transactions are more likely to hedge. Doukas et al. (2003) emphasize that in addition to macroeconomic variables and industry competitive structure, firm specific characteristics such as foreign currency debt, hedging, firm size, leverage, liquidity and growth opportunities also affect firms' foreign exchange exposure. They show that firms with high exposure are more likely to use foreign currency hedging instruments. They also argue that the extent of hedging is dependent upon its cost, and managers' familiarity with hedging instruments. As such, small firms are less likely to hedge.
Turning to the purely empirical literature, the evidence is conflicting.
Whilst the findings by Amihud (1994) , Bartov and Bodnar (1994), and Jorion (1990) indicate that ER movements do not affect firm value, the more recent studies by Agyei-Ampomah et al. (2013) , Choi and Prasad (1995), Dominguez and Tesar (2006) , El-Masry (2006) , and Hutson and Stevenson (2010) find that firms have significant ER exposure.
There are only a few studies which examine ER exposure of European firms. El-Masry (2006) investigates ER exposure of UK nonfinancial companies. By splitting the entire sample period into pre-ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism), in-ERM, and post-ERM, he finds that stock returns of UK firms are more sensitive to ER fluctuations in the pre-ERM and post-ERM periods. Agyei-Ampomah et al. (2013) also examine ER exposure of UK non-financial firms and find that 14.9% of firms are directly or indirectly exposed to ER fluctuations when the standard Jorion's (1990) model is used. However, the estimated exposure increases to 85.13% when using the time-varying regression with orthogonalized market returns.
Among the studies that compare the exposure of Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms, Hutson and Stevenson (2010) find that ER exposure of Eurozone firms is significantly higher than that of non-Eurozone firms in the post-Euro period. However, after controlling for country and firm specific variables, they find no evidence in support of a significant difference. On the other hand, Bartram and Karolyi (2006) find that ER exposure of non-financial Eurozone firms decreases slightly in absolute terms in the post-Euro period.
The above review reveals that the impact of ER movements on the market value of firms is inconclusive. Previous studies also neglect the potential role of financial crises in affecting the relationship in question.
Interestingly though, Agyei-Ampomah et al. (2013) point out that weak evidence of foreign exchange exposure in most previous studies may be due to Jorion's model assumption that exposure is constant over time, in spite of the fact that, in reality, the firm's 'circumstances' (including the extent of international operations and risk management activities) change over time, making its currency risk exposure also expected to vary over time.
The above proposition makes our study, which benefits from the latest available data, particularly opportune, and its contribution timely, since such 'circumstances' may change even more across pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. For example, during a financial crisis a leverage effect may cause asymmetric impacts, meaning that a negative shock would exert a greater influence than a positive shock. It is also plausible to suggest that during a financial crisis firms may become more sensitive to ER movements because, being more liquidity constrained, they are forced to reduce risk management activities, which can be expensive.
Methodology
Following Jorion (1990) , the two factor model used to test for European firms' ER exposure is specified as follows:
where R i represents stock return for firm i; X denotes the percentage change in ER; M is the market return; and t represents time. α i is the constant term and e it is the residual error term with a zero mean and a constant variance.
Coefficients β xi and β mi represent a measure of sensitivity of stock return, i, to exchange risk and market risk, respectively. The presence of a 'market return' variable in equation (1) has the potential problem of introducing multicollinearity which may arise from the possibility that the market and ER factors are correlated. To deal with this problem, the following procedures are employed. First, 'market return', M, is regressed on ER changes:
Second, the component of the market portfolio return that is orthogonal to the changes in the ER (that is, the component of the market return that is not correlated with ER fluctuations) is obtained from estimation of the following equation:
Finally, ER exposure is estimated by regressing firms' stock return on the orthogonal component of the portfolio returns and on the changes in ERs:
where R i represents the stock return of firm i (constituents of Eurofirst 100); X t denotes the percentage change in ERs (USD -Euro, USD -GBP, NEER Euro and NEER GBP) at time t; F t is the orthogonal component of the market portfolio returns (Eurofirst 100 index); α i is a constant term; and ʋ it is the residual error expected to possess white noise properties.
A significantly positive (negative) sign of β xi means that stock returns increase when the ER depreciates (appreciates), based on the indirect quotation. The standard 't test' is used to measure the statistical significance of the coefficients at the customary 5% level.
The appropriateness of the 'two factors' regression model that we employ is confirmed by the fact that this estimation procedure has been used extensively in previous studies (Agyei-Ampomah et al., 2013; Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006; El-Masry, 2006; Hutson and Stevenson, 2010; Kanagaraj and Sikarwar, 2011) .
Following Agyei-Ampomaha et al. (2013) and Hutson and Stevenson (2010) , in order to determine the determinants of ER exposure of individual firms, the following equation is estimated:
where π i is the dependent variable measured as the squared root of the absolute In order to check the robustness of the estimates from equation (5), the model is extended as follows:
where SD i is a dummy variable taking value 1 when the market value of firm i is less than $150 million, and 0 otherwise. Inclusion of this dummy in addition to the MV i variable, is motivated by the fact that examination of the evidence on ER exposure and firm size suggests that this relation might be non-linear (see, for example, Dominguez and Tesar, 2006) . Following Hutson and Stevenson (2010) , we use the threshold of $150 million as the break point, as they find a non-linear relationship between exposure and firm size at that point.
ID i is a dummy taking value 1 when firm i is a financial firm, and 0 otherwise. ED i is a dummy taking value 1 when firm i is a Eurozone firm, and 0 otherwise. A significant coefficient on SD i (λ i ) would indicate the existence of a non-linear relationship between exposure and firm size, while a significantly positive coefficient on IDi (EDi) would indicate that financial (Eurozone) firms exhibit significantly higher exposure to foreign ER movements than nonfinancial (non-Eurozone) firms.
Kanagaraj and Sikarwar (2011) point out that estimation of these models may create biased estimates if not corrected for potential problems of stationarity, multicollinearity, correlation and heteroskedasticity. In the preliminary testing phase, we checked for the integration and cointegration properties of the series and found that the variables were indeed in a cointegrating relationship. The multicollinearity issue is already alleviated within our estimation framework by the orthogonalization procedure explained above while potential correlation and heteroskedasticity problems are eliminated by correcting the OLS standard errors. Following Hutson and O'Driscoll (2010) , the corrective measures we adopted entailed taking the log differences of the variables in equations (1) to (4), the squared root of the absolute value of firms' ER exposure, and the natural log value of 'OP', 'MV', 'DA', 'MB' and 'QR' in equations (5) and (6).
The dataset used in this study consists of weekly prices of 100 during the period of the financial crisis, indicating that firms, and their market value, are more sensitive to ER movements during 'bad times'.
Results and discussion
One possible explanation for this result is the leverage effect, meaning that a negative shock has greater impact than a positive shock. Indeed, a striking and unexpected feature of the financial crisis has been the strong appreciation rather than depreciation of the USD against most currencies globally. Alternatively, the pattern that our data unveils may be rationalized by the fact that during a financial crisis firms become more sensitive to ER movements because, being more liquidity constrained, they are unable to hedge as much.
< Table II These results are consistent with those by El-Masry (2006) who found that 15% of UK firms have significant foreign exchange exposure, and those by Hutson and Stevenson (2010) who found that 10% of Eurozone firms have significant ER exposure. The low number of both Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms exposed to ER risk could be explained by the argument put forward by Bodnar et al. (2002) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) , according to which European 'Blue chip' companies systematically use financial derivatives to hedge transaction risk.
< Tables III and IV here >   Table III reports the regression results of ER (bilateral) exposure of financial vs. non-financial firms, which indicate that there is no major difference between them. 20% percent of financial firms and 16% of nonfinancial firms have significant ER exposure across the full sample period.
These results align well to those of Bodnar and Gentry (1993) , who also fail to find any significant differences. One possible explanation is that both financial and non-financial blue chip companies have equal knowledge and opportunities to hedge ER risk. Significantly, however, our results reveal that exposure increases during the 'bad times' of the financial crisis. This result may also imply that the financial crisis came unexpectedly and these companies, irrespective of whether they were financial or non-financial, were unable to take corrective actions soon enough. Most of the significant β xi coefficients for both financial and non-financial firms have a positive sign,
indicating that a depreciation of the USD-Euro and the USD-GBP ER has a positive impact on the market value of both financial and non-financial firms. Table IV presents the results of equations (5) and (6), which estimate the determinants of significant ER exposure of European firms for the full sample, and the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis sub-periods. The trade openness coefficient is positively significant at the customary 5% level in all sample periods in both equations. There is, therefore, a positive relationship between exposure and country specific trade openness. These findings provide further empirical support to those obtained by Bodnar and Gentry (1993) .
Table IV also shows that the coefficient on firm size is negative and significant for equation (5) in the full sample. This indicates that smaller-sized firms are more exposed to ER movements than larger ones. This result is consistent with previous findings in the literature and can be explained by the fact that larger firms are more likely to hedge currency exposure because hedging activities exhibit economies of scale (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) , and also by the fact that large firms that operate across a greater number of countries are associated with less ER exposure (Pantzalis et al., 2001) . The significance of the dummy coefficient on 'firm size' in the full sample period also confirms that there is a non-linear relationship between exposure and firm size (the relation is stronger for firms with a market value of less than US$150 million), which is consistent with the findings of Chow et al. (1997) and Hutson and Stevenson (2010) . However, the results are mixed in other sample periods, especially for equation (6). As shown in Table IV , the coefficients on the industry dummy (θ i ) and
the Eurozone dummy (ψ i ) are not statistically significant. Hence, there is no difference between Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms or financial and nonfinancial firms' exposure to ERs, which confirms the findings of Tables II and   III after controlling for market effects. (5) and (6) between Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms. The coefficient on country trade openness is positive and significant at the 5% level for both Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms, in both equations. The firm size coefficient is negative and significant for both Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms in equation (5). The results of other firm specific coefficients are mixed. However, The Eurozone dummy coefficient is not significant in both equations, confirming that there is no difference in exposure between Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms. (5) and (6) between financial and non-financial firms. Like the results presented in Tables IV and V, the coefficient on country trade openness is positively significant for both financial and non-financial firms in both equations, while the coefficient on firm size is negative and significant. The results for the coefficients on other firm specific variables are mixed across the sub-samples of firms. In addition, the industry dummy coefficient is not significant in both equations (a similar result is obtained by Hutson and O'Driscoll, 2010) , corroborating the evidence of insignificant differences between financial and non-financial firms.
< Tables V and VI here >
To ascertain the robustness of the results reported above, we reestimated all of the above regressions using the trade weighted Nominal
Effective ER (NEER) (results not reported to conserve space but available from the authors upon request). These additional results essentially confirmed our previous findings based on bilateral ERs, with no significant differences in exposure between Eurozone and non-Eurozone or between financial and nonfinancial firms after controlling for market effects.
However, it is worth mentioning that both Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms' value (for both financial and non-financial firms) was found to be more sensitive to trade weighted (NEER) ERs than bilateral ERs. One possible explanation for this result is that the majority of European firms' trade transactions are denominated in currencies other than the US Dollar. As we found when using bilateral ERs, NEER exposure of Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms (both financial and non-financial) increased during the financial crisis. This confirms that firms are more sensitive to ER movements during 'bad times'. These additional estimations also corroborated the finding that a depreciation/increase (indirect quotation) of ERs (NEER Euro and NEER GBP) has a positive impact on the market value of both Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms as well as financial and non-financial firms. In the majority of cases the sign of significant exposure coefficients was positive, confirming that both Eurozone and non-Eurozone (financial and non-financial) firms benefit from a depreciation of the Euro against bilateral (and NEER) ERs.
The regression results of equation (5) and (6), which re-estimate the determinants of significant ER exposures (using NEER) of European firms (Eurozone and non-Eurozone as well as financial and non-financial) for the full sample, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods were also broadly in line with the results presented in Tables IV, V and VI.
Conclusion
We tested the sensitivity of 100 European blue chip companies' market value to ER movements, and the determinants of such exposure. Using data from 2001 to 2012, we found significant exposure (18% of Eurozone firms and 16% of non-Eurozone firms) with no significant differences in sensitivity across financial firms (20%) and non-financial firms (16%). However, the percentage of significant exposure increases to around 25% during the financial crisis, indicating that firms are more sensitive to ER movements during times of financial distress.
The study also unveiled a positive relationship between ER movements and the market value of firms, indicating that a depreciation of ERs (indirect quotation) is likely to have a positive impact on the market value of European firms. This result holds across Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms, as well as financial and non-financial firms.
In relation to the determinants of exposure, there is no significant difference between Eurozone and non-Eurozone, and between financial and non-financial firms after controlling for market effects. There is a positive and significant relationship between exposure and country specific trade openness.
However, the relationship between exposure and firm specific characteristics is found to be weak, though smaller-sized firms are found to be slightly more exposed to ER movements than larger ones. These results are robust to estimations employing both bilateral and NEER ERs.
The main contribution of our findings lies in highlighting the significant higher levels of ER exposure experienced by firms during the period characterized by the recent financial crisis.
Although with the exception of firm size, there is no evidence that other firm characteristics have strong explanatory power, a clear implication flows from these findings. Given that especially during times of crisis, particularly smaller firms, are found to experience ER exposure, it is recommendable that such firms' financial plans budget for higher liquidity levels in order to build up, during 'good times', a natural hedge for the higher exposure likely to be faced during periods that may be characterized by greater financial distress.
The findings also have interesting implications for investors' decisions in terms of portfolio optimization, particularly at times of financial crises, especially with regards to under-or over-weighting the riskiness of stock pertaining to large multinational corporations vis-à-vis smaller firms.
Despite the value of our contribution, a few caveats ought to be borne in mind when interpreting our findings. First, given that no 'non-Eurozone' firm in the Eurofirst 100 index was from a country other than the UK, the UK was the only non-Eurozone country included in the analysis. Although the UK constitutes the largest and most important European market that is not part of the Eurozone, future research intending to extend our analysis may consider including more non-Eurozone firms from countries other than the UK. Second, future work may investigate further the reason why some firms appear not to Equation 6 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 5 Equation 6 α - Equation 6 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 5 Book Value (MB) and Quick Ratio (QR) in equation (5). In equation (6), Size Dummy (SD) takes value 1 for firm's market value of less than $150 million, and 0 otherwise.
